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Resolving Japan’s Territorial and Maritime Disputes 
with its Neighbors
I. Introduction
Japan currently has important territorial and maritime boundary disputes 
over various islands with all of its neighbors, China (including Taiwan), Korea 
(both South and North), and Russia. To a great extent, these are problems left 
over from the tragic series of Asian wars beginning with the Sino-Japan War 
of 1894-95 and ending with Japan’s defeat in World War II. These disputes are 
relatively unknown to the international community, and even among those in 
the know, they are generally considered bilateral problems, not worth significant 
attention outside the countries concerned. This idea is false, however. Japan’s 
disputes with its neighbors are serious, and military confrontation is not out of 
the question. At a minimum, they are irritants that have retarded the development 
of normal international relations between Japan and the three countries 
concerned, and the establishment of peace and security in East Asia. Now that 
Japan aspires to be a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, 
the existence of these disputes is a major obstacle to attaining that status. Thus, 
they merit the attention of all members of the international community. 
Although these disputes are political in nature, issues of international law 
dominate and point the way to a solution in each case. Each of the disputes 
therefore should be settled according to the applicable legal principles either by 
diplomatic means or through submitting them to international tribunals.
The purpose of this article is to define the disputes, to delineate the legal 
and factual issues involved, and to discuss options and opportunities for their 
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resolution. My thesis is that the tools of international law analysis and dispute 
settlement may be helpful in solving these difficult problems. Legal issues, in 
fact, dominate all of the disputes. Of course, the disputes are political as well, 
but the legal framework provides the key to political and diplomatic discourse 
and to dispute settlement. Japan as well as its neighboring states have accepted 
and ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), which is therefore 
authoritative for all four (or six?) states. The expansion of national maritime 
zones as permitted under this treaty greatly exacerbates and magnifies the 
importance of these island disputes. Not only small, relatively insignificant 
islands are at stake, but also over one million square kilometers of ocean space. 
The peaceful and equitable resolution of these disputes will do much to establish 
peace and security and to enhance regional cooperation in East Asia.  
Map 1: Areas affected by island disputes in East Asia(1)
198 199
Resolving Japan’s Territorial and Maritime Disputes 
with its Neighbors
II. The Disputes
1. The Disputes with China
Japan and China have three distinct disputes: (1) a dispute over the 
maritime zones surrounding Okinotorishima; (2) a territorial dispute over the 
Senkaku Islands; and (3) a dispute over their lateral maritime boundary in the 
East China Sea. 
(1) Okinotorishima
Since 2004 China has claimed the right to conduct marine research and 
other activities in what Japan claims is the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) 
surrounding Okinotori Island (Okinotorishima), is the southernmost point of 
Japan. Japan claims an EEZ and an extended continental shelf on the basis that 
Okinotorishima is an island under the international law of the sea entitled to four 
maritime zones: a 12 mile territorial sea measured from the baseline, normally 
the low-tide line; an additional 12 mile contiguous zone; a 200 mile EEZ 
measured from the baseline; and a continental shelf that may extend as far as 350 
miles from the baseline. China contests the claims to an EEZ and continental 
shelf on the basis of Article 121 (3) of the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, which provides that a “rock” that is above high tide but is unable to support 
human habitation or economic life cannot claim an EEZ or a continental shelf. 
This dispute is therefore over the factual and legal character of 
Okinotorishima.
Okinotorishima is the southernmost point of Japanese territory and 
Japan’s only tropical island. It is located at 20.25 degrees north latitude and 
136.5 degrees east longitude, 1200 km. northwest of Guam and 1700 km. south 
of Tokyo. Its Spanish name is “Parece Vela” and in English it is known as 
“Douglas Reef”. The Tokyo Municipal Government administers the island. Most 
of the island is a submerged coral (table) reef 4.5 km. long and 1.7 km. wide; it 
is shaped like a pear or eggplant with a circumference of 11 km. In addition, five 
islands above high tide existed until 1987, when three of these disappeared under 
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the sea. At present two small, rocky islets exist: Higashi Kojima (6 cm above 
high tide) and Kita Kojima (16 cm above high tide). At one time construction 
was started to make one island a lighthouse and the other an observatory, but this 
work was abandoned. The Japanese Government has constructed some works to 
prevent erosion. Several time in recent years ships have landed or stranded on 
the island causing some damage. 
Before April of 2004, China not only admitted but also supported Japan’s 
claims. This changed apparently because China realizes that in the event of a 
conflict over Taiwan, she must have open sea-lanes between the East China Sea 
and the Pacific Ocean. China’s interest is primarily over security concerns. 
There are various proposals to develop Okinotorishima. One idea is to 
construct an ocean thermal electric generating plant on the island; another is to 
establish fishing and tourism; a third is to raise the coral by constructing polders. 
None of these projects have been finalized. 
Map 2: Okinotorishima
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Map 3: The Location of Okinotorishima and the EEZ around Japan(2)
(2) The Senkaku (Chinese Name: Diaoyu; English Name: Pinnacle) 
Islands.
Japan and China have a territorial dispute concerning the Senkaku (Diaoyu) 
Islands, small, uninhabited islands located in the East China Sea. They are 170 
km. north of the Ishigaki Islands (Japan); 170 km. northeast of Keelung, Taiwan; 
and 410 km. west of the Okinawa mainland. The group is 7 sq. km. of small, 
volcanic islands as follows:
Uotsuri-jima (Diaoyu Dao): 4.319 sq. km. 
Kuba-jima (Huangwei Yu); 1.08 sq. km. 
Taisho-jima (Chiwei Yu) 
Kita Kojima (Beixiao Dao)
Minami Kojima (Nanxiao Dao)
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And three rocks: Okino Kitaiwa, Okino Minamiiwa, and Tobise (no Chinese 
names). 
These islands are administered by Japan as part of Ishigaki City, Okinawa 
Prefecture, but are claimed by China as part of Toucheng Township, Yilan 
County, Taiwan Province. Of course these islands are also claimed by Taiwan in 
its separate dispute with China. 
China claims these islands through records of discovery in 1372 and various 
contacts after that date, ranging from fishing expeditions to gathering herbs on 
the islands. The records of these contacts have not been made public.
Japan claims the islands were “terra nullius” (vacant territory) until the 
late 19th century when, from 1885 on they were thoroughly surveyed by the 
Government of Japan. Japan’s claim rests on its effective administration of the 
islands, which is well documented to begin in 1895 and was uncontested until 
1970/71. The USA administered the islands after World War II until they were 
returned to Japan in 1971 at the same time as Okinawa. 
Map 4: The Location of Senkaku Islands(3)
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(3) The Maritime Boundary between China and Japan in the East 
China Sea. 
The East China Sea is bounded by the Chinese mainland on the west, 
Japan’s Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa Prefecture) on the east, South Korea to the 
north and the island of Taiwan to the south. There is a Japan/South Korea Joint 
Development Zone in the northern part of the East China Sea.
The maritime boundary between China and Japan in the East China 
Sea is contested. The Asian continental shelf (the underwater prolongation 
of the continent) stretches hundreds of kilometers under the East China Sea, 
terminating at the Okinawa Trough, a deep-sea trench west of the Ryukyu 
Islands. Japan claims an Exclusive Economic Zone to a point equidistant 
between the Asian mainland and the Ryukyu Islands. China, however, claims 
its rights to the continental shelf, relying primarily on a natural prolongation 
idea that the physical shelf extends to the Okinawa Shelf. Thus, there is a large 
overlap between the claim of Japan to an EEZ and China’s claimed continental 
shelf rights. 
Since the Senkaku Islands are located in the middle of the East China Sea 
and are features of the continental shelf, they are entangled in the maritime 
boundary dispute. Obviously, if these islands belong to one side or another 
the maritime boundaries are radically affected. Thus, the resolution of the two 
disputes —the territorial dispute and the maritime boundary disputes— must be 
handled together. 
The question of dispute resolution has become urgent in recent months 
because there is every indication that valuable oil and gas deposits are present in 
the East China Sea. The state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
has announced plans to begin exploratory drilling for oil near the Senkaku 
Islands near the equidistance line in August 2005. In its turn, Japan has 
announced plans to grant Japanese companies concessions to drill for oil on its 
side of the contested equidistance line. 
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Map 5: Senkaku Islands and median line and Chinese drilling sites.(4)
2. The Dispute with Korea
Japan’s dispute with Korea (South and North) involves Takeshima (Korean 
name: Dok) Island, which is located in the Japan Sea 92 km. southwest of the 
South Korean Island of Ururundo, and 157 km. northwest of Japan’s Oki Island. 
Takeshima has a total area of 0.23 sq. km., about the size of Hibiya Park in 
Tokyo, and no valuable resources are know to be present in the surrounding 
waters other than fishing rights. Takeshima consists of two large rocks (the east 
and west islands) and several smaller rocks. It has no permanent inhabitants, 
although since 1954 South Korean police personnel have occupied it. Takeshima 
was known as Matsushima before 1905, and older maps and documents often 
confused Takeshima with two nearby islands, Ururundo and Takesho, both of 
which are South Korean. Takeshima also has an English name: Liancourt Rocks, 
adding to the confusion. 
This dispute over Takeshima (Dok Island) intensified in 2004 when South 
Korea issued a Takeshima postage stamp and proclaimed a Takeshima memorial 
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day. This drew a protest from Japan, and Shimane Prefecture also proclaimed a 
Takeshima memorial day. In April 2005 the South Korean Ambassador to Japan 
rejected the idea of submitting the Takeshima issue to the International Court of 
Justice. This is consistent with long-standing Korean policy. South Korea is in 
de facto control and the area is off-limits to Japan. 
Map 6: The location of Takeshima/Dok Island (and Yi Syngman (李承晩 ) 
Line)(5)
3. Dispute with Russia
Japan’s dispute with Russia involves the four so-called “northern 
territories”: Habomai, Shikotan, Etorofu, and Kunashiri Islands at the southern 
end of the Kuril archipelago north of Hokkaido. These four islands (or island 
groups) were occupied by Soviet troops in August 1945 at the end of World War 
II, and many Japanese inhabitants fled. In 1946 Russia annexed these islands and 
forcibly deported the remaining Japanese inhabitants. Russia still administers 
the islands as part of its own territory, although it has offered to return the two 
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smaller islands, Habomai and Shikotan in connection with concluding a peace 
treaty with Japan. Russian military units have largely left the islands and visits 
by the former Japanese inhabitants are now permitted. 
Russia permits fishing vessels from South Korea to fish in the EEZs of the 
islands, causing friction with Japan. In March 2005 Russia announced plans to 
develop mineral resources including oil and gas, gold, silver, sulfur, titanium, 
iron and precious stones. 
The provisional maritime boundary between Russia and Japan is the line of 
equidistance between Hokkaido and Kunashiri. By agreement, Japanese fishing 
is permitted in return for paying a fee around Kaigara Island, a part of Habomai. 
Japan exercises no sovereign rights to the four islands or their surrounding 
maritime zones. 
Map 7: Kuril Islands(6)
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III. The International Law of Territorial Sovereignty
1.  Introduction    
Territorial sovereignty is one of the essential characteristics of the modern 
state and a requirement for statehood. The disputes between Japan and its 
neighbors involve differences of opinion concerning sovereignty over territory. 
Rather than boundary questions —the usual type of territorial dispute between 
neighbors, these disputes involve issues of the acquisition and loss of territorial 
sovereignty. Accordingly, we will briefly review the international law on these 
matters.
2. The Acquisition of Territorial Sovereignty
There are several recognized modes of acquiring territorial sovereignty 
under international law. First, a state may acquire territory by cession, which 
is the transfer of territory, usually by treaty, from one state to another. Second, 
territory may be acquired by what is termed occupation. Occupation as a 
method of acquisition presumes, however, that the territory in question was 
“terra nullius” immediately before acquisition —that the territory belonged 
to no state. Furthermore, occupation giving rise to sovereignty has a technical 
meaning: effective control with the intention and will to act as sovereign. 
Therefore, the state relying on this method must show a requisite number 
of what are termed “effectivités”, —specific factual instances of effective 
control — to prove its case. Third, territory may be acquired by prescription, 
which also depends on showing effective control. But the distinction between 
occupation and prescription is that in the latter case the territory in question was 
not terra nullius, but admittedly belonged to another state. Consequently, the 
effective control in the case of prescription must be longer and more apparent 
than for occupation, because loss of territory by a former sovereign is not 
readily presumed. Fourth, conquest was a recognized method of acquiring 
territory in the past, and though it is not so today, the issue of conquest must 
still be considered. Fifth, an operation of nature may change territory, such 
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as accretion, erosion, or the appearance or disappearance of a volcanic island. 
Sixth, territory may be acquired by international adjudication of some sort. In 
the context of a court or arbitration decision, adjudication is not really a method 
of acquisition, but a method of determining existing rights; but an international 
boundary commission or the UN Security Council may be empowered to decide 
territorial questions that involve awarding as well as settling territorial rights.(7)
Five further observations are necessary. First, these acquisition methods do 
not exhaust all possibilities; they are simply the main methods that offer useful 
analysis when territory is in dispute. Second, the above methods are interrelated 
in various ways in any particular case. Third, a state does not have to be prepared 
to prove its title to every square meter of its territory in terms of one of these 
methods; they are relevant only when title to territory is uncertain or disputed. 
Fourth, acquiescence and recognition of territory play a very important role 
in the acquisition of territory, although they are not strictly speaking modes of 
acquisition. Fifth, territorial sovereignty may also be lost through renunciation. 
Obviously, in the case of Japan’s disputes with its neighbors, several of 
these points and methods are not relevant. Accordingly, we will discuss only 
the relevant methods, which are: (1) occupation; (2) prescription; (3) conquest; 
(4) acquiescence/recognition; and (5) renunciation. We will also discuss several 
concepts closely related to territorial sovereignty: the concept of condominium 
or joint sovereignty; and “intertemporal law”, the question of what is the effect 
when the rules of acquisition change over time. We will also consider the impact 
of political arguments related to the question of territorial sovereignty. 
(1) Occupation
“Occupation” is the method of acquiring sovereignty over territory that is 
terra nullius—claimed by no state. In the Eastern Greenland Case (1933), the 
Permanent Court of Justice said that a claim to sovereignty based on occupation 
requires a showing of two elements: “the intention and will to act as Sovereign; 
and some actual exercise or display of such authority.”(8) The question of the will 
to act as sovereign is a subjective element that can only be shown by objective 
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acts, so in reality what counts is the second element, which is the requirement of 
effective control. Acts of effective control can also demonstrate the first element 
if (1) the activity is not just by an individual, but is that of the state or its agents; 
(2) the activity is consistent with a governmental purpose. 
Thus, the cases resolving disputes over effective control over territory 
turn on which party to the dispute can show concrete activities consistent with 
sovereign control. In the Island of Palmas Case (1928),(9) the US claimed a 
disputed island on the basis of cession from Spain, whose claim was founded 
upon discovery. But the arbitrator held that the discovery claim was trumped 
by the effective control exercised by the Netherlands beginning in the 17th 
century and continuing to the outbreak of the dispute in 1906; relevant acts of 
sovereignty were exercised intermittently by the Dutch East India Company.
The acts necessary to establish sovereign control are held to vary with 
the conditions of time and place, and the nature of the area involved. In the 
Clipperton Island Arbitration: France v. Mexico (1931),(10) the inaccessibility 
and uninhabited nature of the island were taken into account so that an offshore 
geographical survey, a landing by a small party and a declaration of sovereignty 
published in a Honolulu newspaper were held sufficient to uphold the claim of 
sovereignty by France. 
In the Eastern Greenland Case the court awarded sovereignty to Denmark 
on the basis that Denmark had passed legislation relating to the uninhabited 
Eastern section of the island and had granted concessions there. This was 
considered superior to the Norwegian actions, which involved the wintering 
of expeditions and the erection of a wireless station, against which Denmark 
protested. In addition, Norway had not claimed sovereignty until 1931. 
Acts of effective control (also known by the French term “effectivités”) 
will be considered more important if they are diverse in number and include 
legislative, regulatory or judicial acts. This was determinative in the Minquiers 
and Ecrehos Case (1953) ,(11) a dispute over Channel Islands between France 
and the UK. The court appraised the relative strength of the opposing claims 
by considering the nature of the activities of each party. The court stated that 
210 211
Resolving Japan’s Territorial and Maritime Disputes 
with its Neighbors
it “attaches in particular probative value to …acts which relate to the exercise 
of jurisdiction and local administration and to legislation.” The UK was held 
to have the best claim because it had exercised criminal jurisdiction, held 
inquests, collected taxes, and placed the administration of the “Ecrehos Rocks” 
within the Port of Jersey, an uncontested UK territory. Similarly, in the Case 
Concerning Sovereignty over Pulau Ligatan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/ 
Malaysia) (2002) ,(12) the International Court of Justice ruled in favor of Malaysia 
because “the activities relied upon by Malaysia… are modest in number but…
are diverse in character and include legislative, administrative and quasi-judicial 
acts. Moreover, the Court cannot disregard the fact that at the time when these 
activities were carried out, neither Indonesia nor its predecessor, the Netherlands, 
ever expressed its disagreement or protest.”
In the Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration (1998/99) ,(13) which concerned disputed 
Red Sea islands, islets and rocks, the tribunal classified the respective acts 
(effectivités) of government authority of the contending parties as follows:
• Evidence of intention to claim the islands, as shown by public claims to 
sovereignty and by legislative acts seeking to regulate activity on the 
islands; 
• Evidence of activities relating to the surrounding waters, including such 
matters as licensing various acts, fishing vessel arrests, search and rescue 
operations, acts of patrol, and environmental protection; 
• Evidence of activities on the islands themselves, including landing parties, 
construction and maintenance of facilities, overflight, and administrative 
acts. 
The tribunal found, after weighing all the evidence, in favor of Yemen. 
In addition to weighing the quality and quantity of governmental activities, 
a court or tribunal will consider when these took place in relation to certain 
“critical dates”, which will, of course, vary in each case. Three such critical 
dates may be relevant. First, a tribunal may decide if possible the date before 
which the territory in question was terra nullius. This occurred in the Clipperton 
Island Case, where the court determined that before 1858, when France first 
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proclaimed her sovereignty over the island, it was terra nullius. A second critical 
date that may be possible to establish is the moment the rights of the parties have 
crystallized so that activities after that date will not be taken into consideration. 
This was determined in the Indonesia/Malaysia Case. A third critical date 
that may be relevant in a given case is when the dispute arose. In the Eastern 
Greenland Case the fact that the dispute arose only in 1931 was relevant in that 
this was the date on which sovereignty must be found to have existed in one 
or another of the parties. By implication, activities after this date (which will 
inevitably be carried out under protest) cannot affect the outcome. 
In summary, three factual points are especially important in order to 
assert sovereignty: (1) evidence of effective occupation; (2) the exercise of 
governmental authority; and (3) recognition or acquiescence by other states. 
(2) Prescription
The doctrine of acquisition of territory by prescription is very ill defined. 
It operates when territory belongs or may belong originally to another state, 
and a different state exercises continuous and undisturbed acts of sovereignty 
over it for a long period of time. The difficulty of application of this concept 
is obvious. Perhaps the greatest problem is there is no accepted period of time 
in international law for the application of the doctrine; it is held to vary in 
each case. The essence of the doctrine is the passage of time plus the implied 
acquiescence of the dispossessed sovereign.(14) But there seems to be no case 
where territorial acquisition was squarely based on this method. Rather, cases 
such as the Chamizal Arbitration (US/Mexico) (1911) (15) commonly hold that if a 
state protests sovereign acts over disputed territory, the doctrine of prescription 
cannot apply. Thus one effect of the doctrine is the fact that protests can prevent 
acts of control from having an effect on territorial rights.  
The chief utility of the doctrine it seems is that a tribunal faced with 
competing claims can decide the case without first making a definite finding 
that the area in question was terra nullius at some point. Thus the arbitrator in 
the Island of Palmas Case, for example, did not make clear whether the island 
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was under Spanish sovereignty before the Dutch began to exercise control. So 
the doctrine of prescription means that, when facing with competing claims, 
a tribunal may find in favor of the party that can prove the greater degree 
of effective control without basing its judgment on any specific mode of 
acquisition. 
(3) Conquest
Under traditional international legal norms, conquest was a valid method 
of acquiring territory even without a treaty of cession as long as hostilities had 
ended and the conquering state declared its intention by annexation. But this rule 
was changed when restrictions were placed on the right to wage war. Therefore, 
at least since the date of the Covenant of the League of Nations (1919) conquest 
is no longer a valid method. This change in the law brings up the issue of what is 
called “intertemporal law”: the continuing validity of rights gained through acts 
which were once legal but now are illegal or invalid. The general rule is that acts 
are judged by international legal norms as they existed at the time, not as they 
exist at some subsequent time or today.(16) But this is qualified by the famous 
distinction drawn by Judge Huber, the arbitrator in the Island of Palmas Case: 
“As regards the question which of different legal systems prevailing at 
successive periods is to be applied in a particular case…a distinction 
must be made between the creation of rights and the existence of rights. 
The same principle which subjects the act creative of a right to the law in 
force at the time the right arises, demands that the existence of the right, 
its continued manifestation, shall follow the conditions required by the 
evolution of the law.” 
The application of this distinction is unclear, but logically Judge 
Huber’s distinction must be applied judiciously in order not to lead to instability. 
If carried to the extreme every state would have to keep under constant review 
the title to each portion of its territory. And Judge Huber himself did not apply 
the principle to invalidate Spain’s title based on discovery. 
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(4) Acquiescence/Recognition
Where territory is in dispute between two states, it will be relevant if one or 
the other can show that its title was recognized at some point by the other state. 
Recognition can be either in the form of a treaty or a unilateral declaration. Such 
recognition may be express, but it also may be implied from acquiescence — 
failure to object or protest.(17) Also relevant is recognition by or from third 
states.(18) 
(5) Renunciation
Territory can be lost in a variety of ways such as abandonment, cession 
and renunciation. Renunciation of territory must be express; abandonment 
may be inferred from conduct, such as the long-term absence of the exercise of 
sovereignty. 
Where renunciation of territory occurs by treaty, there may be questions 
as to the meaning of treaty language. Such questions must be answered with 
respect to the relevant principles of interpretation of the Vienna Convention. 
Article 31 of the Convention sets out the general rule that “a treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” 
Article 32 of the Convention sets out criteria for recourse to “supplementary“ 
means of interpretation such as preparatory work and the circumstances of its 
conclusion. These can be used only when the interpretation according to Article 
31 leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or leads to a manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable result. 
Another issue that may arise is the question of whether a treaty may 
confer rights on third (non-party) states. As a general rule a treaty only applies 
between the parties to it. This precludes either an obligation or a benefit for 
third states. However, Article 75 of the Vienna Convention states that this rule 
is “without prejudice to any obligation in relation to a treaty which may arise 
for an aggressor State in consequence of measures taken in conformity with the 
Charter of the United Nations with reference to that State’s aggression.”
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(6) Condominia
International law recognizes the possibility of condominium, which exists 
when two or more states exercise sovereignty conjointly over a territory.(19) For 
example, the UK and Egypt had condominium over the Sudan between 1898 
and 1956. The UK and France exercised condominium over the New Hebrides 
until this area gained independence as Vanuatu in 1980. Condominium, however, 
will not be imposed, and as a practical matter can only come into being by 
international agreement. In that case the particular regime of condominium will 
depend wholly on the agreement negotiated to establish it.
(7) Political Arguments
The concept of territorial sovereignty involves extraordinary emotional 
fervor in certain cases. Political as well as legal arguments may be brought to 
bear in any particular case. Three main arguments are usually raised: First, one 
or more of the claimants may argue the principle of geographical contiguity is in 
its favor. Second, historical continuity may be argued as a basis of title. Third, 
where an area is inhabited, the principle of self-determination may become 
involved. 
Although none of these arguments are considered to have determinative 
legal effect,(20) they can sway a decision in close cases. From a legal viewpoint, 
these arguments operate as presumptions —they can be taken into account, but 
are rebuttable by contrary legal evidence of sovereignty.(21)
IV. Islands and International Law
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 121, paragraph 1, 
adopts the following definition of an island: 
“ An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which 
is above water at high tide.” 
This distinguishes “islands” from what are called “low-tide elevations”. 
Under Article 13 of the LOS Convention a naturally formed area of land that is 
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above water at low tide, but submerged at high tide is not an “island” properly 
defined. A low-tide elevation has no entitlement to any maritime zone, not 
even a territorial sea.  However, as an exception to this rule, “where a low-tide 
elevation is situated wholly or partly at a distance not exceeding the breadth 
of the territorial seas form the mainland or an island, the low-water line on 
that elevation may be used as the baseline for measuring the territorial sea.” 
(emphasis supplied). 
Article 121, paragraph 2 of the LOS Convention states that an island 
meeting the definition above is entitled to all four maritime zones specified for 
other land territory: (1) a territorial sea; (2) a contiguous zone; (3) an exclusive 
economic zone; and (4) a continental shelf. 
Article 121, paragraph 3 qualifies this by the statement that a certain 
category of “island”, namely a “rock” that “cannot sustain human habitation or 
economic life of [its] own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental 
shelf.” By implication, then, a rock does possess the other two maritime zones, a 
territorial sea and a contiguous zone. 
The definition of when an island is a “rock” is somewhat problematic. The 
terms “economic life” and “human habitation” are directly linked to human 
activities. Since these terms are phrased in the alternative, one or the other is 
enough to posit an island not a rock. A rock must lack both. Furthermore, since 
human activities can and do change over time, the determination will depend on 
the status of the island at the time the claim is made.
The travaux preparatoires for the LOS Convention show that it is relatively 
easy to claim island status. Human habitation needs not be all year round; it can be 
temporary such as a shelter for seasonal fishing. In addition, economic life may 
include exploitation of the living or non-living resources found in the territorial 
sea. There is no requirement of arable land or potable water to be an island and 
not a rock. Thus, the status of “island” when it comes to small features may vary 
over time and will depend on the human activities carried on in the area.(22)
The process of delineating maritime zones is complicated by the fact that 
all zones begin at what is termed the “baseline”. The baseline is normally the 
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“low-water line along the coast” (LOS Convention Article 5) and the closing 
lines of bays and river mouths (Articles 9-10). In the case of islands with 
fringing reefs, the baseline is the seaward low water line of the reef, as shown by 
the appropriate symbol on charts officially recognized by the coastal state (Article 
6). 
Under customary law and the LOS Convention, archipelagic states are 
permitted to draw straight baselines around the outermost points of islands 
and drying reefs of an archipelago. Japan, North and South Korea, China, and 
Russia all have unilaterally claimed this option. The system of straight baselines 
increases, sometimes dramatically, the areas enclosed by maritime zones. Since 
these straight baselines are drawn unilaterally, the problem arises that different 
nations use varying methods and standards. There is need for agreement both on 
whether straight baselines are permissible and how they should be drawn.(23)
Map 8: Straight baselines claimed by Japan(24)
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Map 9: Straight baselines claimed by China(25)
Map 10: Straight baselines claimed by South Korea(26)
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V. The International Law of Maritime Boundary Delimitation
1.  Introduction
The problem of drawing maritime boundaries between states located 
opposite or adjacent to each other was greatly complicated by the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), which grants coastal states the 
rights to four separate maritime zones: a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles; a 
contiguous zone of 12 nautical miles; an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 
200 nautical miles; and a continental shelf of up to 350 nautical miles. This 
tremendous extension in coastal state jurisdiction gave rise to many disputes, 
and there are now many agreements settling maritime boundaries as well as 
decisions of the International Court of Justice and various arbitral tribunals on 
the issues involved. As a result, the applicable legal principles, if not crystal 
clear, may be stated with reasonable certainty. 
Particularly relevant to the disputes between Japan and its neighbors are the 
legal principles relation to the maritime boundaries between two of the zones: 
the continental shelf and the EEZ. We concentrate on these delimitations in 
this paper. It is particularly important to note that, while in theory each of these 
two maritime zones could have a separate delimitation settled under different 
applicable principles, in practice —both in decisions of international tribunals 
and bilateral agreements — both delimitations are treated together by laying 
down a single maritime boundary without distinguishing between the different 
zones. 
2. Delimitation by Agreement
The preferred option under the LOS Convention is for the states concerned 
to agree on their maritime boundaries. Both Article 74, which concerns 
delimitation of EEZ boundaries, and Article 83, which concerns delimitation of 
continental shelf boundaries, are worded the same: “The delimitation…shall be 
effected by agreement on the basis of international law…in order to achieve an 
equitable solution.” Both articles also provide that, in default of an agreement, 
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“the States concerned shall resort to the procedures provided for in Part XV of 
the Treaty”—the procedures on the Settlement of Disputes.
The rule of law that applies with respect to forging an agreement is “an 
equitable solution”. This is very general and imprecise; it is derived from the 
judgment of the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf 
Cases, where the Court found that there was no governing rule of customary 
law, and, therefore, “delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accordance 
with equitable principles, and taking account of all the relevant circumstances
….”(27) To this end there is an obligation to negotiate in good faith. 
3. The Law of Delimitation in Dispute Settlement
If states cannot agree on their maritime boundaries, they are obligated to 
resort to dispute settlement. This means they must submit to the jurisdiction 
of an international court or tribunal according to the provisions of the LOS 
Convention, Part XV. These provisions and dispute settlement in general are 
analyzed in the next section of this paper. But first we turn to the applicable law 
in such a case. 
The only rule of treaty law that governs dispute settlement is Article 6 of 
the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, which posits that, in the absence 
of agreement, the maritime boundary is to be, in the case of opposite states (two 
states facing each other), the line of equidistance or median line equidistant 
from the nearest points of the opposing states’ shores, adjusted for “special 
circumstances”. What are “special circumstances” is limited. The principal 
drafters of Article 6, the International Law Commission, considered “special 
circumstances” to be only exceptional configurations of the coast and navigable 
channels.(28) But this is a moot point, because none of the states involved in 
the maritime boundary disputes considered in this paper are parties to the 
Convention on the Continental Shelf, so the rule of Article 6 does not apply. 
Thus, we must look to sources other than treaty law for the applicable rules 
of delimitation in contested cases. First, no rule of customary international law 
would seem to beat hand. The International Court of Justice in the 
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Continental Shelf Cases, after extensive analysis, found no applicable customary 
law rule, and none seems to have developed since this case was decided. What 
has developed, however, is extensive judge-made law, which can be considered 
as binding since decisions of international tribunals are one of the recognized 
sources of international law.(29)
There is now an extensive body of international decisional law.(30) In 
addition, we have the example of numerous agreements between states during 
the last 25 years.(31) With this data it is possible to state the applicable legal 
rules in the absence of agreement between states. From a combination of 
state practice and decisional law, the applicable rule is, as stated in the Anglo-
French Continental Shelf Case, “the [maritime] boundary is to be determined on 
equitable principles.” (32)
Distilled from the cases a number of such “equitable principles” can be 
stated: 
• Even if both the EEZ and continental shelf maritime boundaries are in 
dispute, a single maritime boundary will be delimited. The reason for this is 
the practical one of avoiding complexities and overlap that can cause future 
difficulties.(33) 
• The starting point for determining the maritime boundary between opposite 
states will be the equidistance line. 
• The equidistance line is subject to adjustment taking into account “all 
relevant circumstances”.
• “Equitable principles” does not mean that delimitation is an exercise in 
distributive justice whereby the existing resources are to be equally divided. 
What “relevant circumstances” must be taken into account is very broad; 
it is wider in scope than “special circumstances” under the 1958 Treaty on 
the Continental Shelf. Relevant circumstances can include virtually any fact 
considered important in the particular situation involved. Some examples of 
“relevant circumstances” that have been used are the following:
• Geographical circumstances such as concavity or a sudden change of 
direction in the coast. 
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• The presences of islands. If an island is very close to a foreign coast it may 
be enclaved or otherwise not given full value. 
• The presence of navigable channels.
• There should be a reasonable degree of proportionality between the length 
of each party’s coastline and the area of continental shelf attached to it. 
• Relative population densities of coastal areas may be taken into account. 
• Security interests may be considered. 
• The prior conduct of the parties. 
Some factors that have not been considered relevant circumstances in 
recent cases include: 
• Socio-economic factors.
• The natural prolongation of the continental shelf. Geomorphology was 
ignored, for example, in the Tunisia/Libya Case.
The court or arbitral tribunal will have wide discretion on how to weigh 
all of these factors in any particular case. This means it is difficult to predict the 
outcome of any particular case.   
V. International Dispute Settlement and the Role of International 
Adjudication
The LOS Convention, Part XV, obligates parties to resolve disputes 
by peaceful means and to negotiate in good faith and to exchange views 
“expeditiously”. If agreement cannot be reached, the Convention allows the 
disputants to choose any procedure, judicial or non-judicial, to resolve the 
matter.(34)
Where settlement is not possible by means freely chosen by the parties, 
compulsory methods of dispute settlement come into play. Section 2 of Part XV 
details “compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions” that must be used. 
Where no means of dispute settlement has been designated or when parties to a 
dispute have designated different methods, arbitration is the default compulsory 
dispute settlement procedure.(35)
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These compulsory methods of dispute settlement are subject to significant 
exceptions, however. Article 298 of the LOS Convention allows a party to 
declare in writing at any time that it does not accept binding procedures with 
respect to certain categories of disputes, most importantly disputes relating to 
sea boundary delimitations. But if a delimitation dispute is not settled within 
a “reasonable time”, either state party may insist that the matter be referred to 
“compulsory conciliation”.(36) This procedure, which is detailed in Annex V 
of the LOS Convention, involves the appointment of outside conciliators who 
consider the arguments of the parties and render a written report. The parties to 
the dispute are then obligated to settle the matter on the basis of the conciliators’ 
report or some other procedure.(37)
The disputes between Japan and its neighbors China, South and North 
Korea, and Russia, involve both territorial and marine boundary issues. With 
respect to territorial claims, the only legal obligation is to resolve the disputes in 
a peaceful manner through good faith negotiations. Only with respect to marine 
boundary and law of the sea issues do the dispute settlement provisions of the 
LOS Convention apply. 
1. The Territorial Disputes
The three territorial disputes are fundamental and are separate and distinct 
both from each other and from their associated marine boundary disputes. The 
first step in resolving each is to proceed to either agreement or international 
adjudication with respect to each separate territorial dispute. Japan should 
place a high priority on bilateral negotiations with respect to each of the three 
territorial disputes. Alternatively, each of the three territorial disputes should be 
submitted either to international adjudication or ad hoc arbitration.(38)
2. The Maritime Disputes
If the territorial disputes are resolved, it will be much easier to resolve the 
maritime boundary disputes between the parties. In fact, the maritime boundary 
disputes cannot be resolved prior to the territorial disputes except in the case 
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of Okinotorishima, which involves only the law of the seas independent of any 
territorial dispute. 
3. Options for Dispute Settlement
There appear to be several choices to be made in order to settle these 
disputes. One choice would be to separate the territorial and the maritime 
disputes, and to take a step-by-step approach, deferring the maritime boundary 
matters until after resolution of the territorial disputes; the other choice is to go 
for a comprehensive settlement between Japan and each of the three countries 
involved. The preference here would be to come to a comprehensive settlement 
with each country as a partial agreement would no doubt be impractical since 
it would solve very little. A further complication is the de facto existence of 
Taiwan and the fact that there are two Koreas, North as well as South. But 
agreed settlements among Japan, China, and South Korea would, as a practical 
matter, hold up and receive the backing of the international community. 
Another key decision is whether to go for negotiated, diplomatic solutions, 
on the one hand, or to submit the disputes to international arbitration or 
litigation. While such a decision can be made individually regarding each of 
the disputes, there does not appear to be any realistic possibility that any of the 
disputes will be submitted to an international court or arbitral tribunal. Thus, 
negotiated, diplomatic solutions between Japan and each of the neighboring 
countries seem to be the only practical method available at the present time. 
Although no international court will rule on the disputes, international law 
remains a key tool in conducting the necessary negotiations, since all parties will 
wish to start negotiations by asserting their international legal rights. After this 
appropriate compromises can be struck if necessary. Diplomatic negotiations 
can be held between Japan and each party on a bilateral basis. But in one or 
more of the negotiations it may be helpful to employ a third party, such as an 
experienced expert of unquestioned standing and impartiality to serve as a 
mediator or conciliator. Of course, this person would have no power to bind the 
parties or to compel any settlement, which would be up to the parties themselves 
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to fashion and accept.  
VII. Evaluation of the Disputes and Suggested Solutions
1. Okinotorishima
China disputes Japan’s legal right to claim an EEZ and Continental Shelf of 
200 nautical miles surrounding Okinotorishima on the basis that this island is a 
“rock” under LOS Article 121 (3), which limits its maritime zones to a 12-mile 
territorial sea and a 12-mile contiguous zone. China’s position is dictated by 
military and political concerns. China has designated as its “First Security Line” 
a line drawn between the Japanese archipelago and Nansei-shoto to Taiwan;(39) 
and its “Second Security Line”, a line drawn between Ogasawara-shoto to 
the Mariana Islands. China considers it important to keep open sea-lanes for 
military use between the East and South China Seas and the Pacific Ocean. This 
is directed not so much against Japan as against the United States, especially in 
a confrontation over Taiwan. 
China first claimed these rights in April 2004 in reply to a Japanese protest 
over China’s unauthorized survey of the Okinotorishima EEZ. China rejected 
this protest and has repeatedly violated Japan’s EEZ claim by conducting 
research and survey activities from 2004 to the present. China’s current stance is 
a 180-degree change from the past. In 1988, for example, in the Chinese military 
publication, '解放軍報 ', the writer profusely praised Japanese efforts to protect 
Okinotorishima from erosion.(40) Until 2004, China carefully respected Japan’s 
EEZ claim and applied for advance permission to conduct research activities.(41)
Japan has responded to China’s change of policy by monitoring and 
protesting all Chinese violation of the Okinotorishima EEZ. Japan has also taken 
steps to protect against further erosion including the installation of titanium 
bars surrounded by concrete around each of the protruding islets. To guard 
against ship-standings and other navigational accidents, Japan has built a radar 
station and plans to construct a lighthouse. In addition, Japan and the Tokyo 
224 225
Resolving Japan’s Territorial and Maritime Disputes 
with its Neighbors
governmental administration plan to create several possible types of economic 
uses of Okinotorishima: 
• Regeneration and possible exploitation of the coral resources since 
Okinotorishima includes not only the islets of Kita Kojima and Higashi 
Kojima, but also the surrounding coral reefs.(42)
• Construction of an electric generating facility capable of using the 
differences in water temperature on and under the island to generate 
electricity.(43)
• Fishing activity.(44)
• Weather observation and material testing facilities.(45) 
The legal basis of Japan’s claim to the maritime zones surrounding 
Okinotorishima depends on maintaining or creating two distinct factual 
characteristics of this place. 
First, Okinotorishima must continue to protrude above the surface of the 
sea at high tide. There is no question that this is the case today, but whether this 
fact can be maintained in the future is problematic. The present elevation of 
the two islets at high tide is only 16 cm. for Kita Kojima and 6 cm. for Higashi 
Kojima. Sea level has risen substantially in the past century and this is expected 
to continue with no end in sight. It appears Japan may be fighting a losing battle 
against the sea to maintain the islets. Even if no further erosion takes place, sea 
level rise may doom the islets to become only low-tide elevations or to become 
completely submerged. In this case Okinotorishima would lose its island status 
and all its maritime zones. Of course Japan could construct an artificial structure 
over the islets, but this would not satisfy the legal conditions of LOS Article 121 
(1), which defines an island as a “naturally formed area of land”. An artificial 
structure would flunk the test of being “natural”. Thus, the idea of regenerating 
the coral surrounding Okinotorishima may be the key to maintaining island 
status. The coral beds are a natural and integral part of the area, and growing 
coral to build the height of the land above the sea at high tide appears to be the 
best idea.
The second legal issue facing Japan is to satisfy the condition of LOS 
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Article 121 (3) that Okinotorishima is not a “rock” because it is capable of 
sustaining human habitation or an economic life of its own. These are two 
separate matters, and both need not be satisfied. Thus, permanent human 
habitation is not necessary, but some self-sufficient economic use is required. 
Furthermore, the economic use must be centered on and not merely around the 
island. Fishing alone therefore would not be sufficient unless a fish processing 
plant or some other economic facility were located on the island. 
Of the alterative proposals to create an economic use on Okinotorishima, 
the best suggestion appears to be the construction of an electrical generating 
facility. This plant, although it would utilize temperature differentials in the 
waters under and around the island, would still require a building and machinery 
on the island itself. This would appear to satisfy the requirement that the island 
has “an economic life of its own”. 
In summary, Japan should (1) continue to assert the full island status of 
Okinotorishima; (2) vigorously protest and publicize all unauthorized Chinese 
incursions into the Okinotorishima EEZ; (3) continue steps to halt erosion; (4) 
take further steps to build up the island through regeneration of the coral reef; 
and (5) create economic value on the island through establishment of an electric 
generating facility.  
2. Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
(1) The Territorial Claims
An objective application of the law of territorial acquisition and sovereignty 
over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands favors Japan. Under all of the relevant modes 
of territorial acquisition, Japan’s claim is by far stronger than China’s. 
Most relevant is the law of occupation, which presumes that the territory in 
question was “terra nullius”, land belonging to no state and therefore capable of 
acquisition. Under the doctrine of occupation discovery of lands is not enough; 
the claimant to sovereignty must show (1) an intention to act as sovereign and (2) 
actual exercise of administration and authority. The acts of control necessary to 
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prove these two elements are often termed by the French word, “effectivités”. 
Japan’s “effectivités” over the islands began in 1879 after the Japanese 
government established Okinawa Prefecture upon the abolition of the Ryukyu 
Domain. Over a ten-year period, Japan surveyed the islands and came to view 
them as “terra nullius”. In 1895 a Cabinet Decision was taken to incorporate the 
islands into Okinawa Prefecture.(46)
From at least 1884 Japanese nationals were using the islands as fishing 
bases, and in 1895 the Okinawa Government to Koga Shinshiro, a Japanese 
citizen, formally leased certain lands on the islands. Shinshiro and his 
descendents maintained their fishing activities and purchased 4 Islands from 
Okinawa Prefecture in 1932. In the 1930s several buildings and docks were 
built on Uotsuri Island. In 1940, however, the Shinshiro family abandoned their 
enterprise because of financial difficulties. Since 1940 the islands have not been 
inhabited.(47) 
At the end of World War II, in 1945, the islands came under the 
administration of the United States as a result of the US occupation of Japan. By 
the treaty of administration on Japanese islands (群島組織法 ) between Japan 
and the US, the Senkaku Islands were noted to be part of the Ryukyu (Nansei) 
Islands belonging to Japan.(48) The 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty between 
Japan and the US continued American administration under the terms of the 
Peace Treaty.(49) In 1971 the islands were returned to Japan by the Agreement 
between Japan and the United States Concerning the Ryukyu and Daito Islands. 
(沖縄返還協定 ).(50) 
These “effectivités” are specific and governmental in character, and qualify 
under the standards set in the Eastern Greenland (51) and Isle of Palmas Cases(52) 
to show both Japan’s intention and will to act as sovereign and actual exercise 
of sovereignty. Furthermore, even if the islands were not “terra nullius” in 
the 19th century, Japan’s claim is validated by the doctrine of prescription. 
During the period from 1895 to 1971, China (including Taiwan) made no 
objection or protest over Japan’s exercise of sovereignty, and no complaint 
or claim was registered by China when the islands were the subject of two 
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international agreements between Japan and the US. Although no specific 
time period is accepted in international law for the running of prescription, the 
open administration of the islands by Japan and the US over 76 years without 
objection seems more than sufficient to qualify under the prescription doctrine. 
Japan’s claim to the islands is also supported by the doctrine of 
acquiescence/recognition. It is significant that the US as a third state has 
continuously recognized, in fact has taken for granted, Japanese sovereignty. 
China also recognized the legitimacy of Japanese sovereignty until 1971. In 
1871, when Taiwanese people killed several Japanese nationals who accidentally 
landed on Taiwan, China rejected the resulting Japanese protest on the grounds 
that it had no administrative power over the area, including Taiwan. In 1920, 
after Japan rescued several Chinese nationals who were accidentally stranded 
on the islands, China sent Japan a certificate of appreciation stipulating that the 
islands belonged to Japan. In addition, official Chinese maps published as late as 
1970 designate the Senkaku Islands as Japanese territory.  
China’s modern claim to the Senkaku Islands dates only from 1971, and 
was made only after a United Nations survey team(53) found potentially rich 
deposits of oil and gas lay under the seabed around the islands. The basis of 
China’s claim to the islands is twofold: First, China relies upon evidence of their 
discovery in 1372, as well as subsequent visits by Chinese fishing parties and 
expeditions to gather herbs and other plants. China therefore denies the islands 
were “terra nullius” in the nineteenth century. Second, China argues that Japan 
acquired the islands through cession under the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki, 
which ended the Sino Japanese War. If this is the case, Japan lost the islands 
in Article 2 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which renounced all claims to 
“Formosa and the Pescadores”.
However, there appear to be fatal weaknesses to the Chinese claim of 
sovereignty over the islands. First, the basis of the Chinese claim seems to 
be only discovery; there is no record of any “effectivités ” —the exercise of 
administration or government control. Under the customary law standards set 
out in cases such as Isle of Palmas, Indonesia/Malaysia, and the Minquiers 
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and Ecrehos, discovery alone is not a sufficient basis for a claim of sovereign 
acquisition. A showing of government control and administration is also 
required. This appears to be lacking on the part of China. 
Second, there is no evidence the islands were acquired by cession to Japan 
in 1895. The Treaty of Shimonoseki does not mention the Senkaku Islands. 
Moreover, they were not specifically renounced or mentioned in the San 
Francisco Treaty. In fact, the subsequent practice of their administration by the 
US is a definitive indication that the islands were considered by all concerned to 
belong to the Ryukyu (Nansei) Islands group. 
Third, China acquiesced and even on occasion recognized Japan’s 
sovereignty from at least 1895 until 1971, which is the critical date the dispute 
arose. Under the authority of the Eastern Greenland Case, the respective rights 
of the parties had already crystallized so that protests and claims after that date 
cannot be taken into account. 
Therefore, under international law the Senkaku Islands should be 
recognized as part of the territory of Japan. 
(2) Maritime Boundary Delimitation
In the light of the putative resolution of the territorial dispute over the 
Senkaku Islands in favor of Japan, the full extent of the Sino-Japanese dispute 
over their maritime boundary delimitation in the East China Sea can be fully 
illuminated. Three maritime boundary lines may be considered as relevant. 
(1) Assuming Japanese sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, Japan could 
claim an EEZ of 200 nautical miles with the islands as the baseline. This would 
give maximum value to Japan’s sovereign claims and extend her maritime zone 
far into the East China Sea. This option was in fact considered and rejected by 
the Japan Foreign Ministry when Japan ratified the UNCLOS in 1995, reportedly 
“to avoid upsetting China.”
(2) The line Japan did submit as its EEZ claim is the Median Line 
equidistant between the Chinese coast (with allowance for Taiwan) and the 
Ryukyu Islands. This Median Line encompasses the Senkaku Islands within 
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Japan’s claim, but they are not given any value as far as extending Japan’s EEZ 
is concerned. This line thus represents a generous political decision by Japan to 
forego what it would arguably be entitled to claim under international law. The 
maritime boundary delimitation jurisprudence would dictate that the Senkaku 
Islands should be given some, if not full, value in an extension of Japan’s EEZ. 
But Japan has chosen to draw its EEZ boundary with no value at all to the 
Senkaku Islands. 
(3) China’s claim to an EEZ in the East China Sea delimits a line based 
on the natural prolongation of the continental shelf to the edge of the Okinawa 
Trough. This line maximizes the possible Chinese claim and extends China’s 
EEZ to close proximity to the Ryukyu Island chain. 
It is evident that the rival claimants in the East China Sea have taken 
different initial approaches. While Japan has claimed much less than the law 
allows, China has done the opposite and claimed the absolute maximum. 
On the one hand, according to the jurisprudence of the law of the sea, the 
Chinese claim, which is based on the natural prolongation theory, is not valid; 
recent cases such as the Tunisia/Libya Case ignore natural prolongation as a 
factor when delimiting a contested EEZ. On the other hand, the law of the sea 
jurisprudence would allow Japan to claim a larger EEZ in the East China Sea 
than it presently does. While small, uninhabited islands such as the Senkakus 
cannot be the basis for a 200-mile zone, they clearly can be given some value, as 
was done by the tribunals in the Jan Mayan and St. Pierre and Miquelon Cases. 
Alternatively, the Senkaku Islands may be enclaved in a future delimitation and 
given their own EEZ separate from that recognized for the Ryukyus. 
China's claim to an extensive EEZ/Continental Shelf beyond the 
equidistance line that is the limit recognized by Japan rests on two basic 
arguments: (1) the natural prolongation idea that a coastal state may claim the 
entire continental shelf as a physical structure; and (2) the idea that China's 
greater population and size entitle it to a larger share than Japan. However, 
neither of these arguments support in the recent jurisprudence. Although the 
natural prolongation theory was emphasized in the North Sea Continental 
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Shelf Cases (1969) ,(54) later cases have uniformly rejected natural prolongation 
as an important and special circumstance. Similarly, socio-economic factors 
such as the population, wealth or land territory belonging to each party are also 
disregarded as important in the cases.(55) Therefore, China's claim to a maritime 
zone beyond the equidistance line cannot be valid.
(3) Resolving the Disputes
While the possible solution to the dispute under strict international 
law is important, the parties must settle the matter through negotiations 
and compromise. As a starting point it is important to note that Japan has 
already made substantial concessions by not claiming as much as it could 
under international law; while China has maximized its claim. China has also 
proceeded in aggressive fashion to develop the maritime resources of the East 
China Sea. In 2004 China conducted extensive exploration of the area, and 
according to the Japanese Foreign Ministry 22 “illegal” surveys were conducted 
on the Japanese side of the equidistant line. China has also established several 
producing gas wells in close proximity to the putative equidistance line. In 
response, Japan has authorized exploratory energy development projects on its 
side of the line. Thus both nations are developing what is essentially the same 
resource, creating a potentially explosive situation that cries out for a peaceful 
solution. 
What is needed is a comprehensive settlement that respects the legal and 
political rights of both nations. The elements of such a settlement appear to be as 
follows: 
• A definitive determination of sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. 
The best solution would be for the parties to agree to submit this matter to 
an international tribunal for an objective determination. 
• Agreement in principal that the maritime boundary between them is the 
Median (equidistance) Line between Okinawa and the Chinese mainland. 
This line is already the working line accepted by both sides. It can 
be adjusted as needed after the determination of sovereignty over the 
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Senkakus. A separate maritime zone can be added, but with agreement in 
advance that full value of 200 miles will not be recognized.
• A Joint Development Agreement should be concluded between Japan and 
China in order to develop fairly energy resources. 
• The 1997 Fisheries Agreement between Japan and China establishing 
a Joint Management Zone in the East China Sea for fisheries should be 
confirmed and extended. 
In dealing with these disputes, Japan must keep in mind the political 
reality that China’s expansive claims in the East China Sea are part of a 
larger whole: China’s aspiration to a “great China”— a country with a world 
class military and economy and a corresponding political reach. China is 
also concerned with its development and assuring adequate energy supplies. 
Thus, the Chinese leadership is induced to make extravagant and unsupported 
maritime claims as part of this grand strategy.(56) China is building up its navy 
and expanding its maritime reach not only in the East China Sea but also in 
the South China Sea and even the Indian Ocean. China’s exaggerated claims 
are also driven by domestic policy considerations — to cater to anti-Japanese 
feelings. Japan has been much too timid in muting its rightful territorial claim 
to the Senkaku Islands and in foregoing its rightful maritime rights in an effort 
to be “reasonable” to China. This has not contributed to settling the dispute 
but has rather encouraged China’s ambitions. Thus, in the future Japan should 
firmly assert its rights under international law by: (1) renewing and restating its 
territorial claim to the Senkaku Islands while calling for reference of this dispute 
to an international tribunal; (2) vigorously protesting and publicizing Chinese 
incursions beyond the Median (equidistant) Line; (3) proceeding with oil and 
gas exploration and development in the East China Sea; and (4) continuing to 
negotiate with China to avoid military confrontation and ultimately to settle the 
disputes on a fair and comprehensive basis. 
Japan should also undertake a major initiative to solve these problems if at 
all possible. Japan’s policy in the past has been to downplay their significance 
and to “sweep them under the rug.” This is no longer possible. Solving these 
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disputes with China is now imperative, not only to improve bilateral relations, 
but also to begin overdue initiatives to establish regional cooperation and an 
East Asian Community. 
3. Takeshima/Dok Island
(1) The Territorial Dispute
The territorial dispute over Takeshima (Dok Island) dates from 1952, 
shortly after the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty between US and Japan. 
South Korea asserted its claim after it became aware that, at Japan’s insistence, 
Takeshima was excluded from territory renounced by Japan. By acceding to 
this request, the US, which had included Takeshima in the draft treaty, admitted 
the possibility that Takeshima was part of Japan. In response, South Korea on 
Japnuary 18, 1952, declared the so-called Yi Syngman (李承晩 ) Line, which 
formally claimed Takeshima as part of South Korea. In response, Japan took a 
Cabinet Decision on January 28, 1952, formally protesting the Yi Declaration 
and reaffirming that Takeshima was under the jurisdiction of Shimane 
Prefecture.(57)
South Korea’s claim to Takeshima has a long history. South Korea argues 
that historical documents recognize the Takeshima as part of Korea as early 
as 512. At an early age the island was known as Usando ( 干 山 国 ) and was 
considered to be a part of a territory known as Ullungdo. Both were also referred 
to by the name Usan-koku. According to Korean scholars, Usan-koku was 
acquired by the Korean kingdom of Shilla (新羅 ) in 512.(58)
Japan’s claim to Takeshima dates from 1618 when the Tokugawa shogunate 
permitted the Murakawa and Ohya families to use Ullungdo including 
Takeshima as ports of anchorage for fishing activities. By at least 1661 the 
Tokugawa shogunate authorized these families to possess feudal tenure over the 
island.(59) Their use of the area continued until 1696 when, as a result of disputes 
between Japanese fishermen and the islands’ inhabitants caused the Japanese 
Government to declare the area off-limits except for Takeshima proper.(60)
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Japan took formal action to incorporate Takeshima into Japan in 1905. 
On February 22, 1905, Public Notice No. 40 was published (in one local 
newspaper and only in Japanese) by Shimane Prefecture formally annexing 
Takeshima. This action had been quietly authorized in January 1905(61) at a secret 
Cabinet meeting by the central government. Apparently this was done quietly 
to avoid adverse reactions by other countries. There was no official reaction 
from Korea, and there is no evidence Korea even was aware of Japan’s action. 
At this time Japan was involved in war with Russia (the Russo-Japanese War 
of 1904-05). In January 1905, Japan captured the Russian stronghold of Port 
Arthur after a seven-month siege, and went on to win a victory at Mukden in 
central Manchuria. In May 1905 the Japanese navy won an historic victory 
when a Russian relief fleet was destroyed near the island of Tsushima. Thus, 
the annexation of Takeshima was a relatively unimportant part of the policy of 
territorial expansion to the north and on the Asian mainland. In the Treaty of 
Portsmouth (1905) Russia ceded southern Sakhalin and Port Arthur together 
with its surrounding territory to Japan. As a result of its victory and the defeat of 
China ten years before, Korea became a Japanese protectorate and was formally 
annexed by Japan in 1910. 
The first “critical date” in the Takeshima dispute is accordingly 1905, the 
date of its formal annexation by Japan. A key legal issue is what is the status 
of Takeshima immediately prior to Japan’s action at this time. Was the island 
the territory of Korea or Japan? The answer to these questions depends on an 
analysis of the “effectivités” of each country with respect to Takeshima. As 
stated above, neither Korea nor Japan paid much attention to the Takeshima 
before 1905. Japan’s administrative acts at the beginning in the 17th century 
appear to be more vigorous than Korea’s administration; but Korea’s was much 
earlier in time. Comparing these two claims, it appears that Korea’s actions 
incorporating Takeshima into Shilla in the 6th century meet the standard set in 
the Clipperton Island Arbitration. In that case the arbitrator took into account 
the inaccessibility and the uninhabited nature of the island to uphold the French 
claim despite its minimal character. This is similar to Korea’s actions concerning 
234 235
Resolving Japan’s Territorial and Maritime Disputes 
with its Neighbors
Takeshima. Another important factor is that two Japanese government maps 
published respectively in 1875 (army) and 1876 (navy) clearly show Takeshima 
to belong to Korea. In 1877 the government of Japan, in reply to a query from 
Shimane Prefecture whether Ullungdo and “one other island” (presumably 
Takeshima) should be included on the official prefectural map, declared that 
“Ullungdo and the other island are Korean territory, and Japan has nothing to 
do with these islands.” (62) In addition, when the Korean Government in 1900 
approved Imperial Ordinance 41 designating Ullungdo as an independent 
county of Kangwon Province, Tokdo was mentioned apparently as “Sokdo”, and 
considered part of Korean territory.(63) 
This evidence clearly favors a finding that Takeshima was Korean territory 
until Japan’s annexation in 1905. The next question is the effect of Japan’s 1905 
annexation— was this action illegal?
At first glance the annexation of Takeshima by Japan appears clearly 
illegal; after all, a nation cannot annex the territory of another state in secret 
and without permission. Takeshima was clearly not “terra nullius”. But Japan 
has always maintained up to the present that the annexation of Korea was not 
contrary to international law.(64) In fact, the Korean Government accepted the 
Protectorate Treaty offered by Japan in 1905 as well as the Treaty of Annexation 
in 1910. According to this line of reasoning, Takeshima was an integral part 
of the territory of Japan as confirmed by the Annexation Treaty of 1910, and 
while after World War II Japan renounced “all right, title and claim” to Korea in 
the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Takeshima was specifically excluded from the 
territory returned to Korea. Thus, Takeshima is today part of Japan. 
However, this line of reasoning cannot withstand scrutiny. First, the 
annexation of Takeshima in January/February 1905 was separate from the 
process of annexation of Korea by means of the Protectorate Treaty first and 
then the Annexation Treaty. The annexation of Takeshima was purely unilateral 
and done in secret; the Korean Government certainly did not consent and was 
probably unaware of this action. Second, the annexation of Korea was illegal 
under international law norms. The treaties of protection and annexation 
236 237
Resolving Japan’s Territorial and Maritime Disputes 
with its Neighbors
were clearly forced on Korea. Japanese officials arranged the assassination of 
the Korean Queen in 1895, and through military pressure installed a puppet 
government that was induced to dissolve the Korean Army and accepting 
annexation. Coercion of a state or its representatives is one of the grounds for 
invalidity of a treaty,(65) and Japan’s actions at this time meet this test. A further 
ground for considering Japan’s annexation illegal is the international law rule 
that conquest is not a valid method of territorial acquisition. Although this rule 
was not fully in force in 1905, and Japan’s annexation was not accomplished by 
military means, subsequent events must inevitably be taken into account under 
the principle of intertemporal law as expressed by Judge Huber in the Isle of 
Palmas Case.
The exclusion of Takeshima in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty from 
territories renounced by Japan does not affirm that this island belongs to Japan. 
The history of US post war policy toward Japan shows that the Americans 
regarded Takeshima as Korean territory. Shortly after the Japanese surrender, 
on January 29, 1946, the American occupational government issued a decree, 
SCAPIN No. 677,(66) which defined the territory of Japan to exclude Takeshima 
as well as Ullungdo from Japanese territory. This was the operational policy 
of the US throughout the occupation.(67) The draft San Francisco Peace Treaty 
of 1951 also listed Takeshima as territory excluded from Japan. This provision 
was removed only after the Japanese government lodged a protest. But there 
is no indication the Americans intended to incorporate Takeshima into Japan; 
the provision was removed only because the situation was unsettled. Moreover, 
Korea immediately reacted to the exclusion of Takeshima from the 1951 Peace 
Treaty, as stated above, by issuing the Yi Syngman Declaration of January 18, 
1952, claiming Dok Island as part of the territory of South Korea.
In summary, an objective analysis of the legal issues concerning the 
Takeshima territorial dispute yields the conclusion that this island belongs to 
Korea, not Japan.
Although the Korean claim is relatively slight, while Japan's claim rests 
on more substantial administration, Korea's claim to Takeshima is valid based 
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on the analogy with the Clipperton Island Case, where the more substantial but 
later Maxican claim did not take precedence over the earlier, very slight actions 
taken by France. 
(2) Maritime Boundary Delimitation
Under the assumption that Takeshima is South Korean territory, what 
are the maritime boundary implications? In 1999 Japan and South Korea 
established a Joint Fishing Zone in the Japan Sea including the area around 
Takeshima.(68) However, despite this agreement, Korean army vessels now patrol 
the seas around Takeshima, and Japanese vessels are off limits. Settlement of the 
territorial dispute should be accompanied by a new Joint Fishing Agreement that 
would clearly recognize Japanese fishing and management rights in this area. 
In addition, with the settlement of the dispute over sovereignty, the maritime 
boundary between South Korea and Japan could be definitively established. 
Takeshima, as territory of South Korea would have its own maritime zones, 
but since Takeshima is unquestionably only a “rock” under Article 121 (3) 
of the UNCLOS, its maritime area would be limited to a 12-mile territorial 
sea and a 12-mile contiguous zone; Takeshima lacks eligibility for an EEZ. 
Moreover, because of Takeshima’s distance from both Japan and Korea, it 
would be an enclaved maritime area in the Japan Sea. If the Joint Fishing Zone 
were continued, recognition of Takeshima as Korean territory would have little 
practical effect, and Japan would gain new economic rights in the disputed area. 
(3) Resolving the Dispute 
Since South Korea has long refused to submit the Takeshima (Dok 
Island) dispute to the International Court of Justice or some other international 
tribunal, this matter can be settled only through bilateral negotiations. Several 
factors dictate that Japan may consent to a negotiation where the end result is 
renunciation of a claim to the island. First, Japan’s legal case is quite weak. 
If the dispute were to be submitted to a court, Japan would in all likelihood 
lose. Second, the stakes in play are quite minor. Takeshima has no resources 
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other than fishing, and access to fishing and other economic or navigational 
advantages can likely be secured by Japan in the negotiation. Thus, Japan will 
lose little by renouncing its territorial claim; only abstract considerations of 
“sovereignty” and nationalism are really at issue. But these can properly be 
sacrificed in order to end a dispute that has festered for over a century and 
continues to poison Korean-Japanese relations. Japan may in fact reap great 
good will from Korea and countries around the world by handling this matter in 
a statesman-like manner. Ending this dispute may inaugurate a much-needed era 
of friendly relations between Japan and its closest neighbor. 
4. The Northern Territories
(1) The Territorial Dispute
Japan’s dispute with Russia over the so-called Northern Territories has a 
tangled but interesting history. Russia and Japan both laid claim to the Kuril 
Island chain and parts of Sakhalin in the eighteenth century. These conflicting 
claims were resolved in the 19th century by the conclusion of two agreements. 
First, the 1855 Treaty of Commerce, Navigation and Delimitation (known as the 
Shimoda Treaty) provided in Article 2 that “henceforth the boundary between 
the two nations shall lie between the islands of Etorofu and Uruppu. The whole 
of Etorofu shall belong to Japan, and the Kuril Islands lying to the north of 
and including Uruppu shall belong to Russia. With regard to Sakhalin Island, 
rather than establishing a boundary, historical precedent shall be observed.” The 
Shimoda Treaty therefore divides the Kurils into a northern group of 18 islands 
and a southern group (Minami Chishima in Japanese) of two islands, Etorofu 
and Kunashiri. Two of the presently disputed islands, Habomai and Shikotan, 
were not considered part of the Kuril Islands and were considered Japanese 
territory. 
The second agreement was the 1875 St. Petersburg Treaty for the Exchange 
of Sakhalin for the Kuril Islands. Article 2 of this agreement effects an 
exchange: Japan ceded its rights in Sakhelin to Russia in exchange for title in 
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the 18 northern Kuril Islands. Under this agreement the frontier between Japan 
and Russia was the middle of the strait between the peninsula of Kamchatka and 
the northernmost of the Kurils, the island of Shumushu.  
This boundary settlement held until the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. As 
a result of this war, which was won by Japan, the Portsmouth (New Hampshire) 
Peace Treaty of 1905, Article 9, provided that Russia “cede(s) to the Imperial 
Government of Japan, in perpetuity and full sovereignty, the southern portion of 
the island of Sakhalin, and all the islands adjacent thereto…. The fiftieth degree 
of north latitude shall be…the northern boundary of the ceded territory.” 
So things stood until 1943, toward the end of World War II, when the 
Cairo Conference first raised the question of the postwar fate of wartime 
territorial acquisitions. The three allies —the UK, China, and US — issued 
a declaration that “Japan will…be expelled from all…territories which she 
has taken by violence and greed.” This declaration set postwar policy on this 
issue. The question of the Kuril Islands was first specifically raised at the 
subsequent Teheran Conference, which was attended by Joseph Stalin on behalf 
of the Soviet Union. US President Roosevelt was reportedly(69) told incorrectly 
by Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles that the Kuril Islands had been 
awarded to Japan in the Treaty of Portsmouth; thus he was receptive to Stalin’s 
proposition that both Sakhalin and the Kurils should be awarded to the Soviet 
Union after the war. 
Next came the Yalta Conference in February 1945, only two months before 
Roosevelt’s death, at which the allies agreed that “the Soviet Union shall enter 
the war against Japan…. on condition that…the Kuril Islands shall be handed 
over to the Soviet Union.” It should be pointed out that this promise by the allies 
to the Soviet Union is without legal effect under the rules of international law. 
As provided in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 (customary 
law in 1945), Article 34: 
“A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third state 
without its consent.”
The next relevant action was President Truman’s General Order No. 1, 
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which came after the Japanese surrender. The first version of this order on 
August 15, 1945 ordered Senior Japanese Commanders to surrender to Soviet 
Forces in the Far East “within Manchuria, Korea north of 38 degrees north 
latitude and Karafuto [Sakhalin].” On August 16 Stalin sent Truman an urgent 
message reminding him of the Yalta Declaration and stating that “all the Kuril 
Islands” must be inserted onto General Order No. 1. Stalin also asked Truman 
to include in the “region of surrender…to Soviet troops” the northern portion 
of the island of Hokkaido. As a compromise, the final version of General Order 
No. 1 issued on August 23, 1945 ordered: “all of the Kurile Islands” (but not 
Hokkaido) “shall surrender to the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Forces in 
the Far East.”
Soviet troops immediately took over Etorofu and Kunashiri; during 
September 1-4, 1945, they also occupied the Habomai Islands and Shikotan. 
Moscow justified the latter move on the basis that the Habomais and Shikotan 
were part of the Kurils. On September 20, 1945, the Soviet Union unilaterally 
declared that all four islands were now Soviet territory. On February 25, 1947 
language was inserted into the Soviet Constitution that the Kurils were an 
“integral component of the Russian Federated Socialist Republic.”
The Soviet Government’s annexation of the four Northern Territories was 
clearly illegal. First, as we have seen, the Yalta Agreement was totally incapable 
of affecting Japan’s territorial rights. Second, General Order No. 1, even as 
revised to include “all of the Kurile Islands” was not and could not have been 
an authorization of annexation. This order merely determined the areas where 
Japanese forces would surrender to the Soviets as opposed to American forces. It 
was not intended nor could it have any impact on territory. This is obvious when 
one considers that if this order did have territorial impact, the Soviets could 
have annexed Manchuria and North Korea as well. Third, Soviet annexation 
of occupied Japanese territory was contrary to international law. The Hague 
Convention No. IV (1907), Article 47, which specifies the duties of an army 
occupation and an occupying power, prohibits “annexation…of the whole or 
part of the occupied territory.” Moreover, by expelling the Japanese inhabitants 
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of the islands, the Soviets committed grave violations of the humanitarian laws 
of war. 
The most difficult issue concerning the Northern Territories current status 
grows out of Article 2(c) of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty signed by 
Japan, the US and 47 other nations. This Article provides that:
“Japan renounces all right, title, and claim to the Kurile Islands, and 
to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan 
acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of 
September 5, 1905.” 
Although Japan’s Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida protested, the language 
was not altered. Russia argues that this provision confirmed its title to at least 
two of the Northern Territories, Etorofu and Kunashiri.
But Russia cannot claim any right to the Northern Territories flowing from 
Article 2(c). The Soviet Union did not sign the 1951 Peace Treaty; in fact, the 
Soviet negotiators walked out in protest. Article 25 of the Treaty specifies that 
“the present Treaty shall not confer any rights, titles or benefits” on any allied 
power that does not sign and ratify it. This accords with the general international 
law rule that a treaty cannot create either rights or obligations for non-parties. 
The US government also issued an interpretation that the Japanese renunciation 
in Article 2 was not intended to include any of the four Northern Territories. A 
final point concerns the equity of the matter; it would be a gross injustice if the 
Soviet Union and its successor, Russia, were permitted to use the San Francisco 
Treaty as a justification of its obvious violations of the laws of war following 
World War II.
Japan and the Soviet Union began bilateral talks in 1955 to normalize 
relations and to negotiate a treaty of peace. Of course, the question of the four 
Northern Territories loomed large in the discussions. The Soviets softened their 
position and were fully prepared to return Habomai and Shikotan to Japan. 
The Japanese Foreign Ministry for its part began to prepare to accept the return 
of only two of the islands in return for a peace treaty. Then in August 1956 
occurred the now-famous “Dulles Threat Incident”. John Foster Dulles, the 
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US Secretary of State, at a meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Mamoru 
Shigemitsu, brought up the subject of Article 26 of the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty, which states: “Should Japan make a peace settlement with any state 
granting that state greater advantages than those provided by the present Treaty, 
those same advantages shall be extended to the parties to the present Treaty.” 
Dulles suggested, “The Japanese might tell the Soviets that if they were forced 
to give up the Kuriles they would have to give up the Ryukyus as well.” (70) What 
Dulles was saying was that if Japan gave up the Kuriles the “United States might 
remain forever in Okinawa.”(71)
Scholars still debate Dulles’ intent in making this statement. Some believe 
it was a threat to annex the Ryukyus;(72) others, particularly Russian scholars, 
believe that Dulles intent was to derail the peace negotiations.(73) Newly 
declassified US government documents, however, show that Dulles’ intent 
was to strengthen Japan’s hand in dealing with the Soviets. This was the age 
of the Cold War, and US policy toward the Soviet Union was “containment”. 
Dulles wanted to discourage Japan from giving up on the return of Etorofu and 
Kunashiri Islands.(74) 
Dulles’ ploy worked to perfection. Tokyo went back to its insistence on 
return of all four islands. On October 19, 1956 Japan and the Soviet Union 
issued a Joint Declaration, which ended the state of war and resumed diplomatic 
relations, but was not a treaty of peace. The Joint Declaration stated: “The Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan agree to continue…negotiations for the 
conclusion of a Peace Treaty ….In this connection, the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, desiring to wishes of Japan…agrees to transfer to Japan the Habomai 
Islands and the Island of Shikotan (sic), the actual transfer to take place after 
the conclusion of a Peace Treaty.” Some have argued that in signing this Joint 
Declaration Japan again renounced its claim to Etorofu and Kunashiri;(75) but it is 
readily apparent this was not done. Rather, Japan simply acknowledged Russian 
willingness to hand over two of the islands, but insisted on the return of all 
four. The fact that the dispute involves all four islands –Etorofu and Kunashiri 
included– was admitted by Russia in 1993 when President Boris Yeltsin signed 
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the Tokyo Declaration, which called for the resolution of the territorial issues 
involving all four islands. The Tokyo Declaration was followed by a bilateral 
summit meeting in Krasnoyarsk in 1997 at which both nations pledged to make 
“utmost efforts” to conclude a treaty of peace by the year 2000. Of course the 
situation remains deadlocked to the present time. 
In summary, Japan’s claim to the Northern Territories is unequivocal and 
clear under international law. Japan should continue to insist on the return of 
all four islands in talks with Russia. Japan should also enlist the international 
community to exert pressure on Russia to end this dispute and to sign a formal 
treaty of peace with Japan. 
(2) Maritime Boundary Delimitation 
If the territorial dispute over the Northern Territories is resolved, the 
maritime boundary question can be relatively easily resolved. The principle 
of equidistance appears to be quite adequate for the purpose of drawing new 
maritime boundaries in the area between Russia and Japan. 
(3) Resolving the Dispute
On the surface, it would seem quite easy to resolve this dispute considering 
the vast amount of territory enjoyed by Russia. However, Russian reluctance to 
give in stems from the fact that giving the islands back to Japan might induce 
China to ask for the return of areas along the Russian-Chinese border that the 
Soviets took over before and during World War II. In addition, the rich fishing 
grounds of the Kurils provide a great proportion of the fish consumed in Russia 
as well as a source of revenue. Moreover, the Northern Territories may have 
substantial mineral wealth. 
Japan should pressure Russia to submit this dispute to an international 
tribunal. Failing this, bilateral negotiations are the only option, and Japan will 
undoubtedly have to offer substantial economic inducement to gain the islands’ 
return. 
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VIII. Conclusions
In conclusion, Japan should place a high priority on the settlement of 
territorial and maritime boundary disputes with neighboring countries. The 
existence of these disputes casts a negative spell on international relations in 
East Asia. All of these disputes date from the bleak period of war and unrest 
prior to 1945. Japan should seek to put these disputes in the past in order to 
concentrate on a new future in the twenty-first century. 
The disputes with China, Korea and Russia have very different origins and 
involve different political considerations. All, however, involve small islands 
and their surrounding maritime areas. Analysis of the legal aspects of these 
disputes offers an opportunity for Japan and the Japanese people to evaluate 
their negotiating position and the chances of ultimate success. This paper offers 
not only an evaluation of the legal aspects of the disputes, but also suggestions 
on how to resolve them. 
The disputes between Japan and China involve islands in the East China 
Sea and their maritime zones. The legal position of Japan is relatively strong in 
these disputes. China as a rising great power is seeking to maximize its maritime 
position in the East China Sea. The presence of oil and gas resources in this 
area also leads China to assert broad claims to the area. Japan’s legal title to the 
Senkaku Islands is stronger than China’s claim. Japan can also control its destiny 
with regard to future development of Okinotorishima, the southernmost island of 
Japan. It is important for Japan to establish an economic use on Okinotorishima 
in order to assure Japan’s maritime area on its southern border.  
The dispute between Japan and Korea involves Takeshima, a small, 
uninhabited island in the Japan Sea. Takeshima has little value or resources 
other than fishing. Japan’s claim to Takeshima is based on feudal rights granted 
to Japanese nationals and other uses primarily for fishing dating from the 
seventeeth century. Korea, however, appears to have an even older claim dating 
from the sixth century and the Shilla Government. Japan may wish to negotiate 
with South Korea in order to secure economic and fishing concessions in return 
for renouncing Japan’s claim as a gesture of peace and good will. 
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The dispute between Japan and Russia over the Northern Territories has its 
roots in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when both nations explored and 
utilized the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin. Although various treaties established the 
nineteenth century border between Japan and Russia, these were changed by the 
wars of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. At the end of World 
War II, the Soviet Union as an occupying power acted contrary to international 
law by expelling Japanese inhabitants and annexing the four northern islands 
into Soviet territory. Japan has a strong and unequivocal claim for the return of 
these islands under international law. 
Hopefully, the resolution of these disputes will remove irritants that, while 
minor, impede friendly relations between Japan and its neighboring countries. 
The disputes should be resolved peacefully and in accord with accepted 
principles of international law. This may open the way to closer regional 
cooperation among East Asian nations and the establishment of an East Asian 
Community. 
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Case [1982] ICJ Rep.18.
See the Tunisia/Libya Case, op. cit., pp.77-78; the Libya/Malta Case, op. cit., pp. 40-41; the 
Greenland/Jan Mayen Case, op. cit, pp. 73-74.
See Lee, p.549.
See Onishi, pp.93-110. 
See Shin, p.25. For an extensive analysis see also Choung, Il Chee. “Legal Status of Dok 
Island in International Law” Korean Journal of International Law 25 (1997), 1-48.
See Kawakami, pp.70-82.
See Ibid., pp.92-93.
The cabinet decision notes Takeshima is 'an uninhabited island that had no traces of ownership 
by any country.'  See Shin, p.147.
Ibid, pp.101-105.
Ibid, pp.132-142.
See the statement of Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama to the Diet October 11, 1995 as 
reported in the International Herald Tribune, October 12, 1995, p. 4. 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 51-52. 
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を避け、中国との交渉を続けること、の 4つである。
Ⅲ. 竹島
１. 概要
　竹島は日本海の島根県沖に浮かぶ、日比谷公園ほどの大きさの島であり、韓国名で
は独島と呼ばれている。1954年から韓国が警察を常駐させるようになったほか住民
はいない。竹島の領有権については、日本と韓国との間で紛争となっている。日本が
紛争を ICJへ付託するよう提案しているが、韓国側は拒絶している。
２. 評価
　日本は、サンフランシスコ条約で日本が放棄した範囲に、竹島は含まれないと主張
する。韓国は、竹島 /独島は鬱陵島の一部であり、512年に新羅が干山国として領土
に編入して以来自国領であるとする。
　一つ目の決定的期日は、竹島が公式に日本に編入された 1905年であろう。1905年
までは両国とも竹島に関心をはらっていなかった。韓国が竹島 /独島にあまり影響力
を行使できなかった点については、クリッパートン島の事例のように、竹島が大陸か
ら離れた場所にあること、人が住んでいなかったことなどを考慮することができる。
　日本は 1905年に正式に閣議決定によって島根県に編入したと主張するが、これは
非公開の閣議で承認され、韓国への通達なしに秘密裏に行われたものであるので、違
法である。1905年時点で、竹島は明らかに無主地ではなかったので、韓国政府に通
達すべきであった。
　1951年の平和条約で竹島が日本が放棄する範囲から除かれたことは、この島が日
本領であることを宣言したものではない。冷戦時のアメリカの態度がそれを裏付けて
いる。SCAPIN677で、アメリカは竹島を鬱陵島と共に日本の領土範囲から除いている。
また、サンフランシスコ平和条約の草案は竹島を日本が放棄する場所として明記して
いる。この記述は、日本の抗議により本案からは外されたのであるが、アメリカが竹
島を日本に編入する意図を持っていたと示すものはない。さらに、韓国はサンフラン
シスコ条約から竹島が除外されたのを知りすぐに反応している。これらの客観的事実
から見ると、韓国の主張のほうが正当性があるだろう。
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Ⅳ. 北方領土
１. 概要
　北方領土は北海道沖に並ぶ 4つの島である。これらの島々は 1945年の第二次世界
大戦直後にソ連に併合されて以来ソ連／ロシア領となっている。1956年の日ソ共同
声明により、平和条約締結後の二島返還が約束されたが、いまだ実現していない。現
在も島はロシアに占領され、周辺海域での日本船による漁業も困難である。
２. 評価
　北方領土に関しては、日本は四島全ての主権を正当に主張できると考える。ソ連の
北方領土の併合は明らかに違法なものである。まず、ヤルタ会談において千島列島を
参戦と引き換えに手に入れたと主張するが、ヤルタ会談は国際法上、同意を与えてい
ない日本には何の効力ももたらさない。そして、1907年のハーグ条約 47条が示すよ
うに、領土の占領はこの時にはすでに禁じられている。また、日本人を島から追い出
した行為は、国際人権法にも違反する行為である。
　もっとも問題となるのは、サンフランシスコ平和条約 2条 (c)である。この条項で
日本は、千島列島に対する主権を放棄してしまっている。千島列島には択捉・国後が
含まれると考えるが、ロシアはこの条項によりこれら 2島の主権を獲得したと言うこ
とはできない。ロシアはサンフランシスコ平和条約に参加していないからである。そ
して、正義と公平の観点から見ても、ロシアがむりやり奪ったこれら四島への主権を
持つことは許されないだろう。
　日本はこの紛争の解決のために、国際裁判所に紛争を付託すべきである。それがで
きなければ、二国間交渉を続けていくべきである。ロシアがこれら諸島の返還をため
らう理由の一つに、北方領土周辺に広がる肥沃な漁場がある。そのため、日本は領土
返還と引き換えに、何らかの経済援助をする必要があるかもしれない。
これらの紛争は戦後周辺に顕在化したものであり、今も東アジアの外交関係に暗い
影を落としている。東アジアの新しい未来のためには、これらの紛争の解決が不可欠
なのである。
